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Identifying the Effects of Unjustified Confidence versus Overconfidence:
Lessons Learned from Two Analytic Methods
One of the most common findings in behavioral decision research is that people often have unrealistic beliefs about how much they know (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000; Keren, 1991; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982; Yates, 1990) . The most common finding is that people tend to overestimate their knowledge and ability in many different domains, with this overestimation increasing with harder tasks and decreasing with easier tasks (to the point of actual underestimation). Given the pervasiveness of these unrealistic beliefs, a logical next question is to what extent do they influence decisions and outcomes? Although recent research has started addressing this issue, an examination of this issue is complicated by the different potential ways to measure unrealistic beliefs about one's knowledge.
In this paper we compare two was of characterizing unrealistic beliefs about one's knowledge, showing how and where they can lead to different conclusions when used for prediction. One measure, overconfidence, common in behavioral decision research, directly compares an individual's confidence with their actual knowledge. Parker (2008) , for example, used this score as a predictor, finding that adolescents with greater overconfidence scores reported more marijuana use, delinquency, and sexual partners.
The second measure, which we will refer to as unjustified confidence, is more common in social psychology. This approach uses the variance in confidence not explained by actual knowledge as the predictor, which can be computed as the residuals after predicting confidence from knowledge. For example, Jaccard, Dodge, and Guilamo-Ramos (2005) UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 4 found that self-reports about birth-control knowledge, after controlling for actual knowledge, predicted later pregnancy rates.
We first consider conceptual, measurement, and analytic issues distinguishing these two measures. In order to examine the practical implications of choice of measure, we then conduct simulations comparing the conclusions that would be reached with each measure across a variety of situations. Finally, we examine three empirical examples drawn from our own data to provide concrete illustrations of how the two approaches lead to different conclusions.
Overconfidence versus Unjustified Confidence
This section contrasts overconfidence (OC) and unjustified confidence (UJC) as predictors of an outcome variable, 1 highlighting three inter-related issues: the conceptual role of knowledge, the functional form (and associated measurement scale), and the analytic relationship to the outcome variable.
Overconfidence as a predictor
Overconfidence treats knowledge and confidence as equally important and focuses on their relative magnitude, as reflected in a difference score, subtracting knowledge from confidence. Doing so requires measuring knowledge and confidence on equivalent ratio scales.
For example, a common procedure is the two-alternative forced choice method, where respondents first indicate whether a statement is true or false and then indicate their confidence in that answer on a probability scale. A sample item from Parker and Fischhoff (2005) Across a set of such items, researchers calculate the percentage correct (knowledge) and the mean confidence judgment (confidence). Because the resulting knowledge and confidence scores share a common scale, one can be meaningfully subtracted from the other. The signed difference between knowledge and confidence has been called overconfidence, calibration-in-the-large, and bias. This measure offers a meaningful zero point (being "appropriately confident" on average), bracketed by over-and underconfidence.
To use OC as a predictor, one computes the zero-order correlation between the OC measure and the outcome variable. Given the way overconfidence is calculated, this zero-order correlation with the outcome variable is thus equally influenced by one's confidence and one's knowledge.
Unjustified confidence as a predictor
Unjustified confidence, in contrast, treats knowledge as a variable to be controlled.
Because it uses residual variance in confidence, the UJC approach does not require measuring confidence and knowledge on the same scale or measuring confidence on a ratio scale.
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For example, Radecki and Jaccard (1995) measured knowledge as number of correct answers on an 84-item multiple-choice quiz and confidence as responses to a 3-item scale with questions like "In general, how much to you think you know about the topic of birth control?" (with responses anchored at 1 = not at all knowledgeable and 11 = extremely knowledgeable).
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To use UJC as a predictor, one computes the semipartial correlation between confidence and the outcome variable while controlling for knowledge. Thus, this approach means that the resulting (semipartial) correlation is particularly influenced by one's level of confidence.
Formally Contrasting the Two Approaches
UJC analyses use the semipartial correlation between confidence and the outcome, controlling for knowledge. Thus, they consider how confidence covaries with the outcome, independent of knowledge. Mathematically, OC is a constrained case of UJC.
To see this, regress confidence onto knowledge:
Solving for the residual produces:
The semipartial correlation used with UJC equals the zero-order correlation between RESIDUAL CONF and the outcome variable. Because β 0 is a constant, the semipartial correlation equals the zero-order correlation between CONFIDENCE -β 1 KNOWLEDGE and the outcome variable. Since OVERCONFIDENCE = CONFIDENCE -KNOWLEDGE, the UJC semipartial correlation equals the OC zero-order correlation if and only if β 1 = 1. Thus, the OC correlation is a special case of the UJC semipartial correlation. Table 1 summarizes the key differences between the two research strategies.
Implications of the Overconfidence-Unjustified Confidence Distinction
So far, we have attempted to show that OC and UJC approaches to evaluating the effect of unrealistic beliefs about one's knowledge use different analytic techniques and UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 7 thus can reach different conclusions. Conceptually, the key difference between the approaches entails the role of knowledge, whereby in the OC approach knowledge is as important as confidence whereas in the UJC approach knowledge is only a variable to be controlled.
Although this distinction is important in terms of the types of conclusions that can legitimately be drawn, it has not always been recognized. For example, Renner and Renner (2001) found that, over the course of a term, groups that gave confidence judgments became less overconfident and more accurate (i.e., had higher quiz scores) over time, compared to those who did not give confidence judgments. Although the authors concluded that "a decrease in confidence was accompanied by an increase in accuracy" (p. 31), they did not examine whether confidence actually decreased, and in one of their two studies, mean confidence actually increased over the course of the term.
The decrease in overconfidence in this case reflected an even greater increase in knowledge, rather than a decrease in confidence. The improper assumption that a reduction in overconfidence indicated a reduction in confidence, we posit, was due to a lack of clarity regarding whether the research was primarily about the effects of overconfidence or of unjustified confidence. In particular, given the authors'
conclusions, it appears that they were primarily interested in the effects of unjustified confidence, but that they used the OC approach to analyze their data.
Additionally, focusing on only one of the two types of analysis can ignore important insights that could be garnered from the other perspective. As we will demonstrate below in our empirical results, our own (admitted) predisposition to think in terms of overconfidence, rather than unjustified confidence, is blind to situations where UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 8 both knowledge and confidence predict the outcome in the same direction. In this case, a difference score shows no significant relationship with the outcome, even though both knowledge and confidence predict the outcome in a pairwise fashion (and do so somewhat independently). We also present empirical examples where the UJC perspective alone would miss interesting results apparent to the OC researcher.
In order to give a feeling for when such divergences arise, the following section presents simulations designed to cover the possible situations defined by four parameters:
(a) the correlation between confidence and the outcome variable, (b) the correlation between knowledge and the outcome variable, (c) the correlation between confidence and knowledge, and (d) the relative variability in the confidence and knowledge measures.
Simulations
Simulated datasets were randomly generated using the Splus statistical programming language. Each dataset consisted of 1,000,000 observations on three standard-normal variables (knowledge, confidence, and an outcome) with user-defined correlation matrices and variances. With the exception of simulations where variance was systematically varied (Set 2 below), all variables are standard normal (mean = 0, sd = 1). Across the simulations, we systematically varied the correlation between (a) confidence and the outcome, (b) knowledge and the outcome, and (c) confidence and knowledge, as well as (d) the relative variance of knowledge and confidence.
The results of the simulations are presented through two key indices, corresponding to the two analytic approaches, as follows:
1. The zero-order Pearson correlation between overconfidence (equal to confidence minus knowledge) and the outcome variable.
UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 9 2. The semipartial correlation between confidence and the outcome variable, controlling for knowledge.
Additionally, we report the following statistics, as they provide additional insight in some situations:
3. The semipartial correlation between knowledge and the outcome variable, controlling for confidence, which represents the marginal predictive validity of knowledge after accounting for confidence.
4. The multiple R from the regression analysis when the outcome variable is regressed onto knowledge and confidence, which represents the overall predictive validity of knowledge and confidence when used together.
The first set of simulations considers combinations of the knowledge-outcome and confidence-outcome correlations, where confidence and knowledge are uncorrelated and have equal variances. We constrained the correlation between confidence and the outcome to be either positive (r = .5), zero (r = 0), or negative (r = -.5); the correlation between knowledge and the outcome was either zero or positive (r = .5).
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The second set of simulations takes the most interesting cases from the first set and examines results for cases where confidence has twice, the same, or half the variance of knowledge, with confidence and knowledge again being uncorrelated. The third set of simulations again assumes equal variances for confidence and knowledge, but correlations between them are either zero or positive (ranging from .3 to .7).
4 Table 2 summarizes this plan. A comparison of the results from Case 4 to those from Cases 2 and 3 provides perhaps the most striking example of the different conclusions that result from treating knowledge equivalently to confidence (the OC approach) and ignoring knowledge (the UJC approach). In Case 4, knowledge but not confidence is positively related to the outcome. As can be seen in Table 3 , the OC-outcome relationship is identical in Cases 3
and 4 (and reversed sign from Case 2). However, the results with the UJC approach shows no relationship between unjustified confidence and the outcome (unlike Cases 2 and 3). If one examined only the OC-outcome correlation, one might be tempted to draw the incorrect conclusion that an increase in unjustified confidence leads to decreased performance on the outcome. However, since there is no predictive validity in confidence (i.e., overconfidence is simply detecting differences in knowledge), this conclusion would be false. On the other hand, if one were truly interested in the effects of a mismatch between confidence and knowledge, then the OC approach provides the appropriate analysis. Although confidence itself doesn't predict the outcome, the mismatch between confidence and knowledge does.
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Case 5 presents the situation where both confidence and knowledge are positively and equivalently related to the outcome. Here, the relationship between overconfidence and the outcome measure drops to 0, since confidence and knowledge have the same relationship with the outcome and both are considered equally. If one is interested in the effects of overconfidence, it is non-predictive in this case. However, concluding that there is no relationship between unjustified confidence and the outcome would be incorrect, since confidence is highly correlated with the outcome (in both zero-order and semipartial senses) and is truly unjustified, since it does not reflect actual knowledge. In other words, the zero OC-outcome correlation masks the fact that both knowledge and confidence have an impact on the outcome.
In Case 6, confidence and knowledge both correlate with the outcome, but in different directions. This situation causes the OC-outcome correlation to be very large (e.g., when compared to Case 3). However, the results from the UJC approach are identical to that of Case 3. Again, the differing results from the two approaches follow from the fact that the OC approach considers knowledge to the same extent that it does confidence, whereas the UJC approach simply controls for knowledge. Indeed, the OCoutcome correlation is identical to the theoretical upper bound, as represented by the Multiple R.
Note that we have been approaching our discussion of the two analytic techniques as if the researcher were interested in answering only one research question, and the goal was to find the analytic approach that best fits the research question. This situation may well occur in some cases, but as is evident from the simulation results, there is much to be learned by conducting both analyses. For example, a zero-order correlation between UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 13 overconfidence and the outcome would, by itself, not indicate whether the situation more closely resembled Case 1 or Case 5. Similarly, a negative confidence-outcome semipartial correlation says nothing about whether one has a situation more closely resembling Case 3 or Case 6. This same point holds in Sets 2 and 3, where we manipulate other parameters.
Set 2: The effect of differential variability
For this set of simulations, we change the relative variability in confidence and knowledge. This manipulation will have no influence on the semipartial results, since the correlation is a standardized statistic. However, the OC-outcome correlation is affected, since the overconfidence measure is determined primarily by the variable (confidence or knowledge) with the greater variability. This greater influence on the overconfidence measure, in turn, produces a greater influence on the OC-outcome correlation.
To examine the implications, we present three situations: where the variability in confidence is twice that of knowledge, where they are equal (i.e., the Table 3 results are presented again for comparison purposes), and where the variability in confidence is half that of knowledge. Table 4 provides this comparison for each of the six cases, except for Case 1 which is trivial and not reported here.
We will first consider Cases 2, 3, and 4. When the variability in confidence is greater than the variability in knowledge, the OC-outcome correlation is closer to the confidence-outcome correlation. Conversely, when the variability in knowledge is greater, the OC-outcome correlation is closer to the knowledge-outcome correlation (in Case 4, the overconfidence-outcome correlation actually approaches the negative of the UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 14 knowledge-outcome correlation, due to the fact that overconfidence is computed by subtracting knowledge from confidence).
Overall, the results from the OC approach are closer to the results from the UJC approach in the situation where the variability in confidence is greater than the variability in knowledge. At the extreme -where the variability in confidence is much greater than the variability in knowledge (e.g., 10 to 1) -the results of the two analyses will converge and be essentially indistinguishable. This occurs because 1) in the UJC analysis, the fact that confidence and knowledge are uncorrelated means that knowledge has no influence on the semipartial correlation between confidence and the outcome, and 2) in the OC analysis, since the relative variability of knowledge is so small, it has a negligible influence on the OC-outcome correlation. Thus, in this situation, the results of both the OC and UJC approaches approximate the zero-order correlation between confidence and the outcome measure. However, at the other extreme, where the variability in knowledge is much greater than the variability in confidence, the OC-outcome correlation will approach 0 (the knowledge-outcome correlation), rather than .5 using the UJC approach.
Thus, the OC and UJC approaches produce similar results when the variability in confidence is greater than the variability in knowledge, but substantially different results when the variability in knowledge is greater.
Case 5 shows the impact of variability even more dramatically, because the effects of confidence and knowledge on overconfidence are in opposite directions (i.e., knowledge is subtracted from confidence in the computation of overconfidence). As the relative variability in knowledge and confidence changes, the OC-outcome correlation goes from positive to negative. With extreme differences in variability (e.g., 20:1, not UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 15 shown), the OC-outcome correlation ranges from +.50 to -.50. In contrast, the semipartial correlation from the UJC approach is always +.50. Therefore, the results from the OC and UJC approaches can be similar or very different, depending on the relative variances.
In Case 6, where the effects of confidence and knowledge on overconfidence are in the same direction, there is only a small effect of the relative variances on the OCoutcome relationship. Further, since both knowledge and confidence are having the same influence on overconfidence, increasing the variability in one has the same effect as increasing the variability in the other.
In summary, the two analyses typically produce relatively similar results when the variability in confidence is much greater than the variability in knowledge, but substantially different results when the variability in knowledge is greater than the variability in confidence. This is particularly true when the two constructs are working in opposite directions to influence the relationship between overconfidence and the outcome.
Again, which analytic approach is more appropriate depends on the goal of the researcher. If the researcher is interested in unjustified confidence, then the relative variability is unimportant and examining the OC-outcome correlation would lead to the wrong conclusion, one that can be particularly inaccurate if the variability in knowledge is greater than the variability in confidence. If, however, the researcher is interested in overconfidence, then the relative variability is meaningful, and the construct with the greater variability should have the larger influence on the results of the analysis. To investigate the implications of this difference, Table 5 presents four simulations for each Case, where the correlation between confidence and knowledge is set at .3, .5, and .7, as well as the case of zero correlation from Table 3 . Again, Case 1 was excluded as trivial.
Overall, the primary influence of a positive correlation between confidence and knowledge is to reduce the difference between the two analytic approaches. This finding follows directly from the above observation that, in the UJC approach, β 1 increases as the correlation between confidence and knowledge increases. As β 1 becomes closer to 1, the confidence residual as depicted in Equation 2 becomes more and more similar to the overconfidence term, thus leading to the convergence of the two analytic approaches.
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The simulations highlight another issue relevant to the two approaches. As evident in Table 5 , many of our cases show suppression. In Case 2, for example, as the knowledge-confidence correlation increases, the confidence semipartial correlation grows UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 17 larger than the zero-order correlation between confidence and the outcome. Balancing this out is a similar suppression effect with the knowledge semipartial correlation, which departs from zero and becomes more negative with the increased collinearity. The OCoutcome correlation demonstrates a similar pattern, with the OC-outcome correlation increasing as the correlation between confidence and knowledge increases. This same general pattern of results holds in all of our cases except for Case 5. More generally, for a positive correlation between confidence and knowledge, the results from both the OC and UJC approaches will always increase in magnitude as the confidence-knowledge correlation increases, unless both confidence and knowledge are correlated in the same direction with the outcome (e.g., Case 5).
Of course, the situation where both confidence and knowledge are correlated in the same direction with the outcome is common. Case 5 provides a somewhat idealized version of this situation, as both confidence and knowledge have the same correlation with the outcome variable. To explore this situation more fully, we varied the knowledge-outcome correlation to be .00, .10, .30, or .50, keeping the confidenceoutcome correlation at .50. Figure 1 provides the results of the two analytic approaches for these parameter values, varying the confidence-knowledge correlation, essentially along a continuum between Case 2 and Case 5. For each level of the knowledge-outcome correlation, the results from the OC and UJC approaches converge with increasing confidence-knowledge correlations, and the figure highlights two elements of when to expect suppression with the semipartial correlation results. First, when either the confidence-outcome or knowledge-outcome correlation is much greater than the other (e.g., the pattern of correlations is closer to Case 2 than to Case 5), suppression will occur UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 18 more frequently. Second, for large confidence-knowledge correlations, suppression will occur except when both confidence and knowledge have very similar correlations with the outcome. These conditions are in keeping with the conditions where suppression is known to occur (c.f., Cohen & Cohen, 1983) .
Although it may appear from our analyses that suppression is likely, it is worth emphasizing that not all of the situations displayed in Table 5 and Figure 1 are equally common. In particular, much research suggests that under a range of conditions confidence and knowledge will be only moderately correlated at best (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000) . In this situation, suppression is less likely to occur, and there will be less convergence between the results of the two analytic approaches.
Empirical Studies
To provide concrete examples of the above situations, we next present brief descriptions of three empirical studies taken from our own research that cut across very diverse content domains. The first study compares teens' knowledge and confidence about sex and drugs with self-reports of risk behavior and social and family influences. under consideration. One of the datasets is described in more detail in a previous paper (Parker & Fischhoff, 2005) , although the specific results here are original. Complete methodologies for the other two datasets (both original to this paper) are available upon request from the authors. Finally, since all three studies share similar methodologies, a general method is presented first to streamline the exposition. This general method is then followed by details specific to each study's methods and results.
General Method
In each of the three studies, we focus on the relationship between responses to a The Y-DMC KCA consists of 42 items, with three sets of 14 items focusing on general knowledge (e.g., "A robin's eggs are orange"), alcohol and drug use (e.g., "Snorting cocaine can cause lung cancer"), and sex and AIDS (e.g., "You can only get the AIDS virus (HIV) from someone who is gay").
One of the strengths of the CEDAR project is the rich set of comparison measures available, collected from the respondents and their families across the 6-10 years of their participation in the study. We focus on two measures of risk behaviors (marijuana use and alcohol use) and two measures of social and family influence. Marijuana use is the total number of reported episodes of marijuana use, whereas alcohol use is the total number of full drinks of alcohol reported, respectively, up through age 16 (Skinner, 1982) .
For ease of comparison across variables, we coded the data so that higher scores indicated more positive behaviors; thus, both marijuana and alcohol use were reverse coded (i.e., multiplied by -1). The two social and family influence variables considered UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 21 were socioeconomic status (SES; as described in Hollingshead, 1975) and risk status, a binary distinction coded as 1 for high average risk (defined as having a father with a history of substance-use disorders) and 0 for low average risk (if not).
8
Results and discussion. Performance on the KCA was relatively poor, with a percent correct of .52 and a mean confidence of .60, resulting in a mean overconfidence of .08. Knowledge and confidence were substantially correlated (r = .44), with knowledge having a somewhat larger variance. Hence, each of these results will represent the case where variances differ slightly (with knowledge more dominant in the overconfidence score), as well as relatively strong collinearity. Table 6 summarizes the results from all three empirical studies, with Adolescent Risk in the top section. Those who used marijuana less were both less confident (r = -.15) and marginally more knowledgeable (r = .13) than those who used marijuana more.
Using alcohol less was also negatively associated with confidence (r = -.19) but was unrelated to knowledge (r = .00). Thus, lack of marijuana use demonstrates Case 6, where (in the zero-order sense) confidence and knowledge are associated with the outcome in opposite directions. Lack of alcohol use represents an example of Case 3, where the outcome is negatively correlated with confidence but uncorrelated with knowledge.
As evident in Table 6 , both unjustified confidence and overconfidence are associated with poorer outcomes (more alcohol and marijuana use). Note the effect of unjustified confidence is similar for both risk behaviors and greater than would be suggested by just examining the zero-order correlations, due to the suppression that occurs in both situations. The relationship with overconfidence is significant for both UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 22 risk behaviors, but somewhat greater with marijuana use, given the association with knowledge as well as with confidence for that variable. The effects of the differing variances, although small, can be seen as well. For example, as shown in Table 5 , Case 3, when the confidence-knowledge correlation is approximately .50, the confidenceoutcome and OC-outcome correlations should be virtually identical. The fact that lack of alcohol use has a smaller correlation with overconfidence than with confidence is due to the greater variability in knowledge than in confidence. Substantively, however, the primary conclusion to be drawn is that both overconfidence and unjustified confidence are negatively associated with positive outcomes (i.e., fewer risk behaviors). Table 6 also presents the results with the social and family influence variables.
Coming from a high SES environment was positively associated with both knowledge (r = .34) and confidence (r = .16). Similarly, lower risk status (i.e., having a father with no history of substance-use disorders) was positively associated with knowledge (r = .28)
but not with confidence (r = .07). Thus, the two situations represent points between Cases 4 and 5.
Overconfidence shows strong negatively correlations with having positive social and family influences. However, neither variable strongly correlates with unjustified confidence -the result of relatively low correlations between confidence and the social and family influence measures, combined with the high confidence-knowledge correlation. Since confidence and knowledge are correlated in the same direction with the social and family influence measures, and the correlations with knowledge are much greater, the semipartial correlations with confidence become negligible.
UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 23
Using real-world data, these results further highlight how easily the wrong conclusions could be reached if one is interested in investigating the effects of unjustified confidence. In particular, to ensure that any relationships with confidence are not due to knowledge, it would be tempting to deal with this concern by "correcting" for knowledge by computing overconfidence and examining its relationship with the social and family influence variables, suggesting a strong negative relationship. This conclusion, however, would be false. As we have argued throughout the paper, this relationship is not due to unjustified confidence but instead to the positive relationship between knowledge and the social and family influence variables. Indeed, using only overconfidence or confidence alone, it would be very difficult to distinguish the risk-behavior results from those involving social and family influence. It is only by examining the semipartial correlations that the differences between the two sets of results become apparent.
Study 2: Investment
Method. In the Fall of 2001, 109 students enrolled in an introductory marketingmanagement class at a large, mid-Atlantic university participated for course extra credit.
Most respondents were college juniors and seniors majoring in business-related fields.
As part of a larger set of self-administered tasks, participants were tested on their knowledge (and confidence) regarding the recent performance of different stocks.
Specifically, the investment KCA consisted of 50 items, each asking respondents to judge the historical performance of two stocks (e.g., "In the five years prior to 6/31/01, Sony (SNE) stock increased more in value (proportionately) than did the Gap (GPS).").
Two outcome measures were also collected. Specifically, participants (a) created a portfolio of real sector funds to be tracked across time by allocating a hypothetical UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 24 $10,000 to the funds, and (b) predicted the value of those same sector funds four months hence. Respondents were also informed that the respondents with the best performance on the portfolio and prediction tasks would each be rewarded $25. Portfolio Value is the overall value of the sector-fund portfolios after the four-month period.
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Fund Prediction is the mean absolute deviation of predicted and actual sector-fund values after four months. For exposition purposes, Fund Prediction is reverse-scaled (i.e., multiplied by -1), so that higher numbers consistently indicate more accurate responses.
Results and discussion. The investment KCA was also very difficult, with a mean percent correct of just .52 and a mean confidence of .68, resulting on average in .16
overconfidence. Unlike the adolescent-risk study, investment knowledge and confidence were largely uncorrelated (r = .08), with confidence having a slightly larger variance.
The value of a respondent's portfolio was greater for those with greater knowledge (r = .19), but slightly lower for those with greater confidence (r = -.12).
Similarly, fund predictions were better for those with greater knowledge (r = .24) but not for those with greater confidence (r = -.08). Thus, both situations are somewhere between Case 4 and Case 6, but arguably closer to Case 4 given the non-significant zeroorder correlations between confidence and the outcomes.
As shown in Table 6 , the effects of unjustified confidence on investment performance is negative but non-significant for both measures. This result reflects the lack of collinearity between confidence and knowledge, which results in semipartials that are virtually identical to the zero-order correlations. There is, however, a significant relationship between overconfidence and both measures. This result occurs due to the significant knowledge-outcome correlations and the fact that confidence, although only UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 25 weakly related to investment performance, is working in the same direction to influence the overconfidence score as is knowledge.
In sum, across the two tasks, overconfidence is associated with lower performance on the investment tasks. This effect, however, is due primarily to the relationships with knowledge and not with confidence, as indicated by the negligible effects of unjustified confidence. Respondents were then asked to pick the winner and point spread of each of the games in the Sweet 16 round. As with the investment study, two outcome measures were computed here. Pick Accuracy is the number of Sweet 16 games (out of 8) for which the respondent correctly picked the winner. Spread Prediction is the mean absolute deviation of the predicted spread and actual spread (correcting for instances where the incorrect team was picked to win). Spread prediction was reverse coded (i.e., multiplied by -1), so UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 26 that higher numbers represent better performance. As in the Investment Study, the respondents were informed that those with the best performance on these two measures would each be rewarded $25.
Results and discussion. In this study, the mean percent correct on the KCA was .58, with a mean confidence of .69, leading to respondents being, on average, 11%
overconfident. Knowledge and confidence were highly correlated (r = .62) and had equal variances.
Both knowledge and confidence were positively related to performance on pick accuracy (r = .28 for knowledge; r = .41 for confidence), as well as spread prediction (r = .29 for knowledge; r = .32 for confidence). Thus, both pick accuracy and spread prediction reflect examples of Case 5, although the relationship with confidence is slightly greater than with knowledge for pick accuracy.
Given that these situations provide examples of Case 5, the UJC approach produces stronger results than does the OC approach. In particular, overconfidence is unrelated to spread prediction and only slightly related to pick accuracy. Unjustified confidence, however, is slightly related to spread prediction and moderately related to pick accuracy. Note that these relationships exist despite the large correlation between confidence and knowledge, which has substantially dampened the semipartial correlations.
Thus, the results with the basketball task are substantially different than with either of the other tasks. First, there is a stronger relationship with unjustified confidence than with overconfidence, unlike the results in the previous situations. Second, unjustified confidence is positively related to positive outcomes, not negatively or UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 27 unrelated as in the previous studies. We will discuss possible reasons for both results subsequently.
General Discussion
We have attempted to show that there are two distinct questions that can be addressed within the general framework of determining the consequences of unrealistic beliefs about one's knowledge -one focused on the effect of overconfidence and one on the effect of unjustified confidence. We began by distinguishing these two different goals and proceeded to compare the analytic approaches for addressing each of them.
Using a set of simulations, we then discussed the implications of the two analytic techniques in detail, paying particular attention to situations where the two approaches produce different results. Finally, we presented three empirical studies, each examining the effects of overconfidence and unjustified confidence in specific substantive domains.
As we have emphasized repeatedly, use of an analytic technique inappropriate for the research question under investigation can easily lead to an incorrect conclusion. We have already discussed the situations under which the two analytic techniques produce different results in some detail. Thus, we will turn next to the substantive issue underlying this paper -how do unrealistic beliefs influence decisions and outcomes -and end with a discussion of when to use the two methodological approaches.
Are Unrealistic Beliefs About One's Knowledge Bad?
As should be evident, the answer to this question depends on whether one is interested in examining the effects of overconfidence or of unjustified confidence. In terms of overconfidence, the results across the studies and measures are reasonably consistent. With the exception of the basketball study, greater overconfidence was UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 28 associated with negative outcomes or influences in each of the studies. In particular, overconfidence was related to risk behaviors, poor social and family influences, and poor performance on the investment tasks. This result should not be particularly surprising,
given the substantial positive relationships between knowledge and the criterion variables in most cases. Since overconfidence treats knowledge and confidence equivalently, there will tend to be a negative relationship between overconfidence and the criterion variable as long as the (positive) relationship with knowledge is stronger than the relationship with confidence. Furthermore, as discussed below, when confidence has a negative relationship with the outcome, the OC-outcome relationship will be even stronger -a result amplified by suppression effects when confidence and knowledge are positively correlated.
The results for unjustified confidence were less consistent across the measures and studies. In particular, unjustified confidence was negatively related to risk behaviors, was unrelated to social and family influences and investment performance, and was positively related to performance on the basketball task. In terms of the risk behavior
variables, it appears that people who think they know more, holding constant how much they actually do know, are more apt to exhibit more risky behaviors than people who are less confident about their knowledge. Since the risk behaviors studied in the adolescentrisk study are generally considered maladaptive (see Parker & Fischhoff, 2005) , unjustified confidence appears to be problematic in this situation. In contrast, unjustified confidence in the basketball study was actually a positive predictor of performance, perhaps because confidence influenced some (unmeasured) psychological or behavioral mediator (e.g., using the knowledge they do possess) that was in turn beneficial in this UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 29 situation. The inconsistent results across studies suggest that unjustified confidence has different effects in different situations. For example, higher confidence (regardless of knowledge) might lead an investor to make riskier investments. In healthier markets, greater risk taking may lead to greater investment success (as has been argued in bull markets), whereas in bear markets, risk taking may not be as beneficial (or even harmful).
This suggests that the effects of unjustified confidence, working through psychological and behavioral mediators, may be moderated by situational factors (see Stone et al., 2004) .
Which Analytic Approach is Preferable?
Throughout the paper, we have been arguing that the effects of overconfidence versus unjustified confidence are distinct issues that will not always produce the same results. While doing so, we have intentionally refrained from suggesting that either goal is more important than the other. Indeed, they are both valuable for answering different questions. Researchers interested in determining the effects of confidence on variables like information search (e.g., Radecki & Jaccard, 1995) typically are interested in the effects of unjustified confidence, not overconfidence, per se. In contrast, the overconfidence approach examines the match (or mismatch) between confidence and knowledge, and its impact on related behaviors and behavioral outcomes (e.g., Parker & Fischhoff, 2005) . As such, the focus is on the effect of being well calibrated (at least in this specific sense). This difference in perspective, therefore, can lead to very different conclusions -and justifiably so, provided that the results are interpreted in a fashion consistent with the analysis.
Therefore, there is a good argument for considering both OC and UJC approaches when designing new studies. In addition, this expanded perspective may be beneficial in the re-analysis of studies originally designed to address only one approach, as illustrated in our empirical re-analysis of the adolescent-risk data.
Although the analytical approaches will often produce different results, it is worth re-emphasizing that they are related. Literally, examining the effect of unjustified confidence is identical to examining the effect of confidence when confidence and knowledge are uncorrelated, but is identical to examining the effect of overconfidence when confidence and knowledge are perfectly correlated. Thus, in a very real sense, the OC and UJC approaches become indistinguishable when confidence and knowledge are highly correlated. As has often been noted, however, confidence and knowledge are frequently relatively uncorrelated (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000) . Since the two analytic approaches differ the most in such situations, we would expect frequent divergence in results of the two approaches.
A final note on suppression effects
In closing, we would like to comment on the role of suppression effects in the two analytic approaches. It turns out that confidence and knowledge are the types of variables that should be particularly likely to produce suppression effects. As discussed by Cohen and Cohen (1983) , suppression is likely to occur when two positively correlated variables have different-signed effects on an outcome variable (or alternately, when two same-sign predictors are negatively correlated). As illustrated in our empirical work, even though confidence and knowledge are frequently not as highly correlated as one might expect, the two variables are generally positively correlated. Logically, this shown for example with the basketball study, it appears to occur in many situations.
Thus, suppression should exist in many examinations of the effect of unjustified confidence. This is of interest more than just as a statistical oddity. Suppression represents a situation where the combination of predictors allows for stronger prediction (i.e., larger multiple R) than would the two predictors considered individually (Cohen & Cohen, 1983) . Hence, in certain situations, the consideration of both knowledge and confidence together may have the added advantage of even stronger predictive validity. In order to be able to directly compare overconfidence and unjustified confidence in analyses presented below, confidence and knowledge are measured on the same ratio scale for the remainder of the paper. However, all findings regarding unjustified confidence hold without equivalent ratio scales.
3
This parameterization for knowledge assumes that knowledge is not harmful. Of course, in the situation where confidence and knowledge are uncorrelated, the effect of unjustified confidence will always be the same as the effect of confidence (i.e., the semi-partial correlation will always be the same as the zero-order correlation).
However, we will continue to refer to the "effect of unjustified confidence" as that is the issue under investigation.
7
For the same reason, for negative values of the correlation between confidence and knowledge, β 1 becomes negative, and the results from the two analytic approaches diverge.
8
Whereas we focus on a few CEDAR variables here, the results generally hold for the broader range of variables considered by Parker & Fischhoff (2005) . The one exception to this general trend was the variable positive peer environment, which Parker and Fischhoff included with their group of social and family influences, but showed patterns more similar to the risk behaviors (Parker & Fischhoff, 2005) .
9
These data were collected right after 9/11/2001, while the time period assessed in the KCA was prior to 9/11/2001. The market was currently in a downward spin (and participants were generally aware of this), so risk taking was an especially bad idea. .71 NOTE: r X,Y represents the zero-order correlation between X and Y. r X,Y|Z represents the semipartial correlation between X and Y controlling for Z. The Multiple R is generated from regressing the outcome onto confidence and knowledge.
UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 41 .71 NOTE: Var X is the variance of X. r X,Y represents the zero-order correlation between X and Y. r X,Y|Z represents the semipartial correlation between X and Y controlling for Z. The Multiple R is generated from regressing the outcome onto confidence and knowledge.
UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 42 na. NOTE: r X,Y represents the zero-order correlation between X and Y. r X,Y|Z represents the semipartial correlation between X and Y controlling for Z. The Multiple R is generated from regressing the outcome onto confidence and knowledge. * Cannot be solved for, as the Choleski decomposition is not full rank. The point at which the computations break down is .5, so the values reported for a knowledge-confidence correlation of .5 are actually computed at r = .499.
UNJUSTIFIED CONFIDENCE AND OVERCONFIDENCE 43 NOTE: Solid lines represent OC-outcome correlations, whereas dashed lines represent confidence semipartial correlations. In these examples, r CONF,OUT = .50 and r KNOW,OUT ranges from 0 to .5.
